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Abstract We put i-deals under the microscope and critically review its definition, theory and 
empirical evidence with the aim of provoking debate about this intriguing idea. We scrutinize 
definitions of i-deals, highlighting confusing aspects and critique its features. We assess the 
offered theoretical mechanisms linking i-deals to putative outcomes, and consider whether i-
deals provide a novel lens to understanding the employee-organization relationship. We 
consider how i-deals research findings could – rather than showing the benefits of i-deals – 
be interpreted as reflecting how i-deals may damage employment relations and unit-level 
productivity. Finally, we identify problems with the ways i-deals have been measured and 




The notion that some employees cut special deals with their employers in order to advance 
their own interests will strike a chord with most people. We may know of occasions when we 
have made such arrangements; more likely, we may suspect others in our workplace have 
such arrangements. Furthermore, i-deals fit with some evidence and management discourse 
about the increasing individualization of the employment relationship and proliferation of 
different types of employment contracts (Bidwell et al., 2013).  
We put i-deals under the microscope and critically review its definition, theory and 
empirical evidence with the motivation of provoking debate about this intriguing idea. We 
begin by briefly reviewing the current state of i-deals research and then gauge the extent to 
which it has captured researchers’ interest. We highlight confusing aspects of the i-deals 
definition and critique its features. Following this, we assess the offered theoretical 
mechanisms linking i-deals to putative outcomes and consider whether i-deals offer a novel 
lens to understand the employee-organization relationship. Finally, we identify problems with 
the ways i-deals have been measured and raise issues about the research designs used in 
empirical studies.    
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Current state of i-deals research 
 
“I-deals refer to voluntary, personalized agreements of a nonstandard nature negotiated 
between individual employees and their employers regarding terms that benefit each party” 
(Rousseau, Ho & Greenberg, 2006, p. 978). The distinguishing features of i-deals are that 
they are individually negotiated by either the employer or the employee, heterogeneous in 
that some of the terms are differentiated from what other comparable employees receive, 
mutually beneficial so that both the interests of the employee and employer are served, and 
vary in scope from a single idiosyncratic element to an entirely different deal (Rousseau 
2005; Rousseau et al., 2006). Researchers argue that organisations use i-deals to recruit, 
retain and reward high performers; for employees, i-deals can signal their market value or the 
value an employer places on the individual employee (Rousseau et al, 2005, 2006; Rosen, 
Slater, Change & Johnson, 2013).  
So, what does the empirical evidence reveal? Table 1 provides an overview of the 
fifteen published empirical articles (a few of the articles contain multiple studies) on i-deals 
in terms of definition, dimensions, outcomes, moderators, design, findings and sample. A 
noticeable feature is the variation in definitions of i-deals used by researchers. Definitions 
commonly include employees negotiating a special employment arrangement (not on offer to 
other employees) with their employer. Beyond this, the definitions diverge: some for instance 
focus on the benefit to both the employee and employer (e.g., Lai, Rousseau & Chang, 2009), 
while others are more employee-focused in highlighting the satisfaction of specific personal 
preferences and needs of the employee (e.g., Ng & Feldman, 2012b).  
The definitions also indicate that i-deals can cover a single idiosyncratic element to a 
completely different ‘deal’ involving many different terms. However, researchers tend to 
operationalize i-deals as having a small number of dimensions, elements, or terms. Studies 
differ in terms of the range of dimensions and which dimensions are captured. For example, 
Anand et al. (2010) focus on one dimension, developmental i-deals; Bal et al. (2012) include 
developmental and flexibility i-deals; Hornung et al. (2008) capture three dimensions: 
developmental, flexibility, and workload reduction i-deals; Rosen et al. (2013) capture four 
dimensions: schedule flexibility, task and work responsibilities, location flexibility, and 
financial incentives; finally, Ng and Feldman (2010) draw on six elements to capture i-deals.   
Most studies consider whether employees’ self-reports of i-deals are associated with 
self-reported outcomes. I-deals have been linked to a wide range of outcomes, including 
affective commitment, work-family conflict/balance, work engagement, voice, proactive 
behaviours, motivation to continue working, working overtime, citizenship behaviours, and 
employee performance. Five studies consider factors that may moderate associations between 
i-deals and proposed outcomes (e.g., Bal, De Jong, Jansen & Bakker, 2012). 
With such a variety of outcome variables, it is difficult to discern a pattern in the 
findings. A recent meta-analysis pulls together the findings of 23 published and unpublished 
studies across Western (i.e., Germany, the United States, and the Netherlands) and Eastern 
(i.e., China, India, and South Korea) cultures, and suggests some consistency across studies, 
where i-deals were significantly negatively related to turnover intentions, and positively 
related to job satisfaction (in Western and Eastern cultures) and affective commitment (in 
Eastern cultures) (Liao, Wayne & Rousseau, 2014). However, tempering confidence in the 
positive effects of i-deals, it should be noted that the effect sizes were small (ranging from .09 
to .25), based on small numbers of samples (ranging from 2 to 5), and the findings were 
somewhat inconsistent in that i-deals did not relate significantly to affective commitment in 
Western cultures (based on aggregated findings from 5 samples).  
Research designs used to examine i-deals tend to offer weak forms of evidence. The 
majority of i-deals studies are cross-sectional or separate the measurement of the independent 




and dependent variables. In the minority are longitudinal studies used with repeated measures 
of the independent and dependent variables (see for example, Ng and Feldman, 2012b; Rosen 
et al., 2013). In general, the stronger the research design, the weaker the support for the 
effects of i-deals and therefore findings based on weak methods may exaggerate support for i-
deals (note this is based on only a small number of repeated measures studies). For instance, 
Hornung et al.’s (2011) longitudinal findings are less supportive than other studies based on 
cross-sectional findings (cf. Hornung et al., 2008) in terms of failing to find lagged 
associations between i-deals and expected outcomes (a non-significant lagged association 
between flexibility i-deals and work-family conflict), and also finding lagged associations 
that question the assumed direction of causality between i-deals and outcomes (significant 
reciprocal associations between developmental i-deals and work engagement). Elsewhere, 
longitudinal findings indicate changes to i-deals vary alongside changes in the outcomes of 
social networking and organizational trust (Ng & Feldman, 2012b), providing stronger 
evidence of covariation than cross-sectional designs but not provide insight into the direction 
of causality.         
In summary, the empirical studies offer some support for associations between i-deals 
and outcomes; however, the effects of i-deals are small and somewhat mixed. Against this 
backdrop, we now begin our critical review, considering first whether i-deals have energised 
research activity. 
 
Researcher interest in i-deals 
 
I-deals researchers typically claim that it is an area of great interest and attention, being a 
“topic of considerable research” (Anand et al., 2010, p. 970), and one that has received 
“considerable attention as a means of building organizational commitment” (Ng & Feldman, 
2012b, p. 1). However, the level of interest is belied by the small number of available 
empirical articles (as Table 1 indicates), and indeed researchers acknowledge that there have 
been “few empirical studies” (Ng & Feldman, 2012b, p. 2). 
To gain some indication of the extent of i-deals research activity since its introduction 
we searched for i-deals journal articles in Business Source Complete, a popular and 
comprehensive database of scholarly business journals. We took Rousseau’s 2005 book on –
deals as introducing the i-deals concept, although we note Rousseau’s 2001 article in 
Organizational Dynamics and some precursor studies cited by i-deals researchers (such as 
Lawler & Finegold, 2000; Miner, 1987). Since 2005 and over the last 9 years, only 21 articles 
include the term “i-deals” or “idiosyncratic deals” in the abstract of scholarly peer-reviewed 
journal articles (as of 17 November, 2014). Furthermore, and as Table 1 reveals, Rousseau 
and her collaborators author seven of these 21 articles. 
To place this level of research activity in context, we compared it to research activity 
on the psychological contract during the 9-year period after Rousseau’s 1989 
reconceptualization of the psychological contract, which was widely regarded as 
reinvigorating psychological contract research (Conway & Briner, 2005). Comparing i-deals 
with the psychological contract makes some sense, as both concepts and related theories were 
generated by Rousseau, both are often portrayed as rooted in social exchange, and both were 
presented as examples of a trend in the individualization of the employment relationship. 
During the 9-year period between 1989 and 1998, a search in Business Source Complete 
shows 63 articles include the term “psychological contract” in the abstract of scholarly 
journal articles.  
From this crude analysis, we conclude that researchers have shown lukewarm interest 
in i-deals since its introduction, in both absolute and relative terms, and there is little 
indication as yet of it being an area of current major interest. Indeed, we may well ponder: 




why the lack of interest? Potential explanations for the low uptake may be that the idea lacks 
a precise definition, clear theoretical mechanisms linking it to outcomes, and that the i-deals 
concept lacks unique value beyond existing ideas. To these matters we now turn.  
 
I-deals definitions lack clarity, precision, and consistency 
 
As we can see from Table 1, i-deals definitions have some common features (Rousseau et al., 
2006) and in this section we focus on three features which follow clearly from inspecting the 
definitions: I-deals are (a) individually explicitly negotiated; (b) beneficial to parties; and (c) 
non-standard, idiosyncratic bargains that range in scope of content and vary across 
employees. In this section, we highlight some critical inconsistencies and ambiguities across 
definitions. 
 
To what extent are i-deals explicitly negotiated? 
 
It is currently unclear whether i-deals result from explicit negotiation with another party or 
arise from more implicit negotiations. Some i-deals definitions clearly emphasize that they 
refer to explicit and objective agreements where, for instance, Anand and colleagues state 
that “i-deals are not individuals’ subjective understandings, as are psychological contracts … 
rather, they are objective conditions that employees negotiate with an employer” (Anand et 
al., 2010, p. 970). Elsewhere in i-deals research, it is defined and referred to in a way that 
emphasizes more implicit processes. For instance Ng and Feldman (2010, p. 420) refer to 
employment “arrangements” which are “crafted” to meet the needs of employees; i-deals are 
likely to be construed as “special gestures” (Anand et al., 2010, p. 972). Furthermore, most i-
deals research uses social exchange as the theoretical foundation of i-deals (Rosen et al., 
2013), where social exchanges consist of unspecified obligations that can be short or long 
term and open-ended. This implicit nature is illustrated for example, when researchers argue 
that following successful negotiation of i-deals, employees are “likely to feel obligated to 
those who granted or enabled their deals” (Anand et al., 2010, p. 972, italics added). 
Therefore, even if the initial i-deals negotiation of what the employee gets tends toward 
explicitness, what the employee is expected to do in return is assumed to follow a social 
exchange process, where organizations expect obligations to be discharged, but do not know 
when or how. In other words, whether employees reciprocate may well be highly implicit. 
Related to the explicit or implicit nature of i-deals is whether they are made public or 
held at a private level. I-deals literature tends to state that it is desirable for i-deals to be made 
public; however, in most cases this will not be the case: “Coworkers may view i-deals 
positively if their visibility or public nature makes them appear normative. In most firms, i-
deals are not public, instead taking the form of informal, private arrangements” (Lai et al., 
2009, p. 553). The language of informal, private arrangements is much closer to an implicitly 
negotiated deal than one that is explicitly objective, and such i-deals will certainly be viewed 
as implicit by third party coworkers who may speculate about the fairness of employees 
receiving i-deals and be concerned that favouritism is taking place. 
In summary, the implicit aspects of i-deals are unclear. The extent to which i-deals are 
explicitly or implicitly negotiated is important because if it is implicit, then i-deals become 
indiscriminate to psychological contracts and i-deals should therefore be viewed as much 
more subjectively understood by employees. If i-deals are highly subjective, then individuals 
may have a sense of receiving a beneficial deal, but cannot be sure of its benefits because it is 
implicit and they will be unaware of other employees’ implicit i-deals. As an implicit 
phenomenon, perhaps i-deals will not satisfy ‘star’ employees who seek demonstrable, 
objective indictors of their value to the organization that clearly distinguishes them apart 




from their peers. From an organization’s perspective, if i-deals are a highly implicit 
phenomenon then it will not benefit organizations that wish to use i-deals as a means of 
communicating or signalling an equity-based culture where the most valued employees are 
duly rewarded. To conclude, the extent to which i-deals are implicit is unclear; if they are 
highly implicit, then the concept of i-deals risks being indistinct to psychological contracts, 
and its value to organizations as a signalling mechanism is greatly reduced. 
 
Do i-deals benefit one or both parties? 
 
It is currently unclear whether i-deals are mutually beneficial to both employees and the 
organization, or beneficial to only one party, or indeed involve costs to one or both parties. 
There is inconsistency between the definitions used by researchers as to whether i-deals are 
mutually beneficial (or not). On the one hand, the definitions used by Rousseau and 
colleagues and Bal and colleagues clearly stress that i-deals are intended to benefit both the 
worker and organization negotiating the i-deal (e.g., in Table 1, see definitions by Anand et 
al., 2010; Hornung et al., 2011; Lai et al., 2009, etc.). On the other hand, definitions, 
particularly those arising from Ng and Feldman (2010, 2012a, 2012b) emphasize the benefit 
to employees but do not emphasize employer benefits (e.g., i-deals are “crafted to meet the 
specific needs of individual employees”, Ng & Feldman, 2010, p. 420). Indeed, Ng and 
Feldman go further to state that “practically speaking, idiosyncratic deals are costly to 
organizations” (Ng & Feldman, 2010, p. 219), which is clearly evident when i-deals involve 
lucrative compensation packages. Even advocates of the mutual benefits of i-deals somewhat 
understatedly acknowledge the costs to organizations, where “an i-deal granting supervisor 
may tolerate some inconvenience to promote an i-deal” (Anand et al., 2010, p. 972). 
I-deals research is also unclear about when organizations expect to accrue the benefits 
of i-deals. Are the benefits to organizations clear and objective at the point of negotiating the 
i-deal or are the benefits more a reference to the hoped-for longer term effects of the i-deal 
that are assumed to materialize through a social exchange reciprocation process at some 
unspecified future time point? The i-deals literature tends to assume that the benefits of i-
deals from an organization’s perspective accrue via social exchange processes, where 
employees receiving an i-deal feel obliged to reciprocate. However, as we noted above, 
obligations arising from social exchanges are only likely to be discharged at an unknown 
future time point (Rosen et al., 2013), and therefore when do organizations become aware of 
the benefits, if at all? If there are doubts about when the intended benefits to the organization 
will arise, or if benefits will arise at all, can it still be considered an i-deal? 
More clearly establishing who benefits from i-deals is important for several reasons. 
First, mutual benefits are seen as the key factor differentiating i-deals from favouritism: “I-
deals differ from favouritism because they are intended to benefit not only their recipient but 
also the recipients’ organization” (Anand et al., 2010, p. 972). Note, however, that Rousseau 
et al. (2006, p. 980) acknowledge that the distinction between i-deals and favouritism is a 
“gray area” in some instances. In other words, the case for the benefits of i-deals can appear 
to argue for the benefits of favouritism, which is likely to be unpalatable in most workplaces. 
Second, the ambiguity about whether i-deals are intended to benefit just the employee 
or in addition to the organization casts doubt on our ability to identify i-deals. For instance, if 
an i-deal benefits only one party, is it still an i-deal? If it is beneficial to only one party, how 
is it to the other party – neutral, or potentially costly? And if we allow i-deals to benefit only 
one party and are agnostic as to how it affects the other party, then can organizations benefit 
at the cost to an employee? For instance, i-deals could be interpreted as having a ‘dark-side’ 
where organizations single-out and make an example of an under-performing employee. This 
may benefit the organization, be idiosyncratic, but not to the employee’s benefit. Thirdly, the 




idea that i-deals are mutually beneficial is a nice fantasy, but such win-win deals are unlikely 
in real life. Social exchanges entail give and take and even if there are some benefits to each 
party, there will also be costs. This aspect of i-deals is rarely considered. For example, do 
parties to an i-deal benefit on each and every term of the arrangement, or on some terms but 
not others?  
 
Clarifying the contents and recipients of the non-standard, idiosyncratic bargain in i-
deals 
 
Two interconnected issues about clarifying the scope of the contents of i-deals (i.e., the 
terms) and scope of recipients (i.e., who is eligible for i-deals) are troubling. Regarding the 
scope of i-deals, the contents are acknowledged as very wide-ranging, for example: “I-deals 
vary in content and scope from a single feature to the entire set of conditions composing the 
employment relationship, ranging from minor adjustments in hours or duties to highly 
customized” (Hornung et al., 2008, p. 656). I-deals, therefore, can be about anything and 
everything. 
Turning to who are the likely recipients of i-deals, the literature is unclear as to how 
widely available they are to employees. Some i-deals literature suggests they are reserved for 
‘stars’ and “highly valued employees” (Rosen et al., 2013, p. 710), who will be “particularly 
excited about being the only one (or one of a few) to receive rare and valued resources” (Ng 
& Feldman, 2010, p. 420). However, other literature presents the offering of i-deals as a 
much more routine and widespread happening (such as Anand et al., 2010), and indeed the 
fact that i-deals can range so widely across terms of an employment relationship suggests 
they are in theory widely available. 
The routine and widespread contents of i-deals is concerning for several important 
reasons. First, if i-deals can refer to negotiated arrangements about relatively minor terms of 
the employment relationship, then they are likely too trivial, widespread and mundanely 
available to be described as idiosyncratic or valuable. For example, flexibility i-deals (Bal et 
al., 2012; Hornung et al., 2008) do not seem noteworthy of a major shift in employment terms 
and may simply reflect institutionally available options such as working part-time, which in 
some countries (e.g., the UK) employees have a legal entitlement to request part-time work. 
Similarly task i-deals (e.g., Hornung et al., 2011; Rosen et al., 2013) may reflect the routine 
managerial activity of dividing work across team members. Such i-deals are therefore readily 
distributed and unlikely to signal special treatment to employees or instil obligations to 
reciprocate. 
In conclusion, the above set of interconnected concerns about the three defining 
features of i-deals amount to a considerable lack of clarity. These concerns are important 
because without a clear definition we cannot make clear theoretical predictions, we cannot 
consistently operationalize i-deals, and practitioners will not know how to enact i-deals in 
workplaces and the benefits of doing so (or not). 
 
Theoretical mechanisms linking i-deals to employment relationship outcomes 
 
In this section we argue that there is no novel and unique theoretical mechanism 
linking i-deals to outcomes. Furthermore, the two general theoretical mechanisms (needs, and 
in particular social exchange) linking i-deals to outcomes offer ambiguous predictions. 
Finally, research has insufficiently considered how i-deals may damage employment relations 
and unit-level productivity. 
What is the theoretical mechanism that links i-deals to outcomes? Researchers 
hypothesize that i-deals will be associated with employee attitudes, behaviour, and 




performance, but do not specify in any precise way what evaluative feature of i-deals 
explains outcomes. What is it about i-deals that relates to outcomes? We can again make a 
useful contrast here with psychological contract research. In psychological contract research, 
the main construct linking the psychological contract to outcomes was not psychological 
contracts per se, but the specific construct of psychological contract breach (i.e., when 
employees perceive the organization to fail to fulfil promised obligations, Conway & Briner, 
2005). For i-deals, the research suggests that having an i-deal leads to outcomes, but we have 
already noted above that the definition of i-deals encapsulates multiple features. So which 
feature drives outcomes? The definitions of i-deals make reference to an employee the 
organization values, successful negotiation of benefits, the receipt of benefits themselves, and 
fulfilling employee needs. These distinct components could all feasibly affect employee 
attitudes and behaviours, raising questions about what specifically it is about i-deals that 
affect outcomes. For example, are the positive attitudes associated with i-deals a result of the 
actual negotiation process or the benefits resulting from the i-deal?  
Researchers commonly refer to the two general mechanisms of social exchange and 
fulfilling employee needs when making i-deals predictions. Dealing first with needs, while 
needs are often referred to in the definitions and texts, the references are brief, general and 
often taken to be read as self-evident in benefitting parties. There is therefore very little 
substantial material to get our teeth into here, other than to say that the needs mechanism is 
under-specified and under-problematized. For instance, if i-deals have benefits through 
satisfying needs, then which needs precisely as there are many needs and indeed typologies 
of needs (Maslow, McClelland, etc.). It is also worth noting that the theoretical value of 
needs and need theories have well-document limitations, such as vaguely defined concepts, 
being impossible to refute and appearing to explain all behaviour, yet offering no clear basis 
for predicting any behaviour (see, for example, Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977; Wahba & Bridwell, 
1976). 
Turning to social exchange as a general mechanism, it is commonly deployed when 
explaining the effects of i-deals on employee attitudes and behaviour. Is its application to i-
deals compelling? The argument in part rests on whether i-deals are beneficial in creating 
obligations in the recipient to reciprocate (Anand et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2013; Ng & 
Feldman, 2012b). However, as previously mentioned, it is unclear whether i-deals are 
governed by mutual benefit or more driven by organizations’ attempting to satisfy the needs 
of employees. As Liu et al. (2013, p. 833) note “the willingness of employers to cater to 
individual employees needs signals to employees that they are special and worthy of 
employers’ special treatment”. This resembles what has been referred to as a communal 
relationship (Clark & Mills, 1979), in which the giving of benefits is driven by the desire to 
meet the needs of the other party and without the expectation that these benefits will be 
reciprocated. If so, then the assumption that i-deals instil obligations in recipients to 
reciprocate may well be erroneous. Furthermore, if i-deals are viewed by employees as a 
reward for past contributions then the recipient may feel entitled to any additional benefits 
received with little felt obligation to reciprocate. 
Finally, we note that the potentially damaging effects of i-deals at the individual and 
unit level have been insufficiently considered. At the individual level, the positive correlation 
identified in some empirical studies between i-deals and employee attitudes and behaviours 
has been interpreted by researchers as reflecting how the recipients of i-deals report more 
positive attitudes and behaviours; however, an equally plausible alternative interpretation is 
that the positive correlation found reflects the majority of employees who do not receive i-
deals in the work unit reporting lowered morale as a result of making unfavourable social 
comparisons to recipients of i-deals. Employees consciously and unconsciously make social 
comparisons to others they work closely with and these processes profoundly shape employee 




attitudes and behaviour (Adams, 1965; Festinger, 1954; Goodman, 1977; Salancik & Pfeffer, 
1978). I-deals researchers draw on processes of favourable social comparisons to explain why 
the small number of recipients of i-deals report more positive attitudes and behaviours (e.g., 
Ng & Feldman, 2010, 2012a, 2012b, 2013); by the same token, the majority of employees 
will not receive i-deals and will presumably be making unfavourable and likely demoralizing 
social comparisons, resulting in less positive attitudes and behaviours. There are many 
compelling theoretical reasons for suspecting that offering i-deals to a select few may 
negatively affect the majority of employees who do not receive the i-deal, such as believing 
an injustice has taken place and/or psychological contract violation. This in turn would 
damage their motivation and behaviours towards the organization and their peers, perhaps 
especially helping behaviours towards those employees who indeed receive i-deals. 
There is some evidence to support this view. Broschack and Davis-Blake’s (2006) 
study of two large, multinational financial organizations in the United States found that the 
degree of heterogeneity of employment arrangements in a work group (mixing standard and 
non-standard workers in the same work group) had significant negative effects on employee-
to-supervisor relations, co-worker relations, helping behaviours, and a positive effect on the 
intention to leave. The authors concluded that “nonstandard work arrangements designed to 
retain valued employees may negatively affect work group relations… creating an 
idiosyncratic deal in order to keep an individual involved in an ongoing work group may in 
fact cause intragroup relations to deteriorate” (Broschack & Davis-Blake, 2006, p. 389). This 
suggests that while some lucky workers benefit from their individual i-deals, individuals in 
the wider group or unit may experience losses, which could lead to a negative overall effect 
for the unit’s productivity. The unit as an aggregate is perhaps particularly likely to suffer, as 
co-worker relations and helping behaviours take a hit, and the social and psychological 
climate suffers. 
It is odd that justice perceptions have not yet been empirically examined alongside i-
deals. The awareness that an employee has obtained an i-deal is likely to raise justice 
concerns amongst his/her colleagues as we note above and has been noted elsewhere 
(Greenberg, et al., 2004). We considered distributive justice, however, other researchers note 
concerns relating to other justice dimensions. For example, Greenberg, Roberge, Ho and 
Rousseau (2004) argue that to mitigate the potential negative effects, all employees should be 
treated consistently so that they all have the opportunity to negotiate an i-deal. If making the 
opportunity for all employees to negotiate i-deals facilitates procedural justice, what is the 
implication of this for the nature of the deal itself? Rather than being a coveted deal reserved 
for highly valued employees, it becomes a widespread minor deal on offer to all. 
Injustice is but one possible downside to i-deals. To date, the outcomes focus on the 
positive consequences of i-deals with little consideration of a fuller range of negative 
outcomes. For example, an employee sensing that a few co-workers are receiving i-deals 
without knowing the specific terms may feel paranoid, jealous, and envious. For the i-deal 
recipient, it may encourage individualism, self-interest and a heightened sense of entitlement. 
Research that considers co-workers’ views of those receiving i-deals suggests that i-deals 
thrive in (and generate?) environments of self-interest. Lai et al. (2009) found that co-workers 
were more likely to accept their colleague receiving an i-deal when the colleague is a close 
friend, and when they believe it increases their chance of a comparable future opportunity. 
The effects of i-deals on organizational outcomes were found to be stronger for people high 
on individualism (Liu et al., 2013).   
In summary, there is a need for better theorizing on the multilevel effects of i-deals, 
notably the individual-level effects and the group-level effects. I-deals may be associated 
with benefits for those who receive them, but bring significant losses for those who do not, 
which, given they constitute the majority of a work group, may lower the overall unit’s 




performance. Hence co-workers (i.e., the majority of employees not receiving i-deals in the 
unit), the unit in aggregate, and the organization may lose out. 
 
Concerns about the designs and measures used to empirically research i-deals 
 
Here we first identify concerns about survey measures used to research i-deals and second 
raise concerns about the broader research designs employed. 
Regarding the survey measures, our first observation is that i-deals have not been 
consistently measured, there is little agreement about how to measure i-deals, and little 
interest in full measurement validation studies (see Rosen et al., 2013 for an exception). 
Considerable variation exists as reflected in the following: some measures require 
respondents to comment on exchange items that are “different from his/her coworkers” 
(Anand et al., 2010), some require respondents to rate the extent to which they had “asked for 
and successfully negotiated individual arrangements different from their peers” (Hornung et 
al., 2008), and others require respondents to rate the extent the organization has “promised a 
level of [the item, e.g., pay] that most employees in my team/unit do not get” (Ng & 
Feldman, 2012).  
Second, and related to the previous point, none of the measures are true to its 
definition, which requires i-deals to be individually negotiated, different from peers, and 
mutually beneficial. I-deals measures variously capture one of these features, but not two or 
more. The measures have therefore not operationalized crucial defining features of the 
definition of i-deals.  
Third, the range of content of i-deals terms/dimensions varies considerably across 
studies. In some studies the range of content is very narrow, capturing one or two terms 
(typically flexibility, development), whereas in other studies up to 6 terms are captured (e.g., 
pay, advancement opportunities, skill training, career development opportunities, a level of 
job security, support for personal problems; Ng & Feldman, 2010, 2012a). I-deals are defined 
as very wide ranging, so why such narrow operationalizations? The measures need to better 
capture the wide breadth of content of i-deals.  
Fourth, the items do not indicate a clear time frame over which the respondent is 
expected to consider the striking of the i-deal. We do not know therefore whether the 
respondent is recalling an i-deal negotiation from relatively recently or several years ago. 
Clearly, the timing of the negotiation is important as to how accurately the event will be 
recalled and its relevance in predicting employee attitudes and behaviours. 
Finally, the incidence / reported levels of i-deals are frequently at improbably high 
levels given that i-deals are supposed to be ‘special’ and idiosyncratic (e.g., 3.30 on a 7 point 
Likert type scale
2
, strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7), Anand et al., 2010; ranging 
from 3.83 to 3.90 across 6 measures on a 5 point scale, strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree 
(5), Ng & Feldman, 2012b). The high levels of reported i-deals do not credibly reflect the 
idea that they are received by a chosen few, which would dictate a low base rate 
phenomenon. Are these measures of i-deals therefore really capturing i-deals as a select 
negotiation, or something much more mundanely available, such as stable perceptions of job 
characteristics? 
These issues are important because they suggest that the studies are measuring 
different constructs, capturing very different elements of the deal, and fundamentally are not 
fully consistent with i-deals definitions and therefore not valid proxies for i-deals. 
                                                          
2
 As an aside, the use of Likert scales is perhaps inappropriate as i-deals are more likely to be experienced as 
discrete events and should be measured as such, rather than strength of agreement. 




We now turn to research designs used to investigate i-deals. Our first concern here is 
that i-deals studies have typically neglected to collect multi-source data (e.g., information 
from both employers and employees simultaneously) and therefore cannot assess whether 
both parties benefit from an i-deal. To assess i-deals and the impact of i-deals, we require 
research designs that capture employee and employer’s perceptions of the i-deal, along with 
both parties’ assessments of the benefits. 
Data should also be collected from third party coworkers who make up the wider 
social group and to explore unit-level effects in addition to individual-level effects. As we 
noted above, to assess the benefits of i-deals to the organization we need to know how i-deals 
affect the wider social group within which the person receiving the i-deal belongs. For 
example, to what extent do i-deals impact such outcomes as unit / group cohesion, 
collaboration, psychological climate, and productivity? While a small number of employees 
receiving an i-deal may report benefits, the larger number of employees not receiving an i-
deal may report comparatively more negative attitudes as a result of negative social 
comparisons made with those who receive i-deals, which may tip the unit into experiencing 
aggregate losses. It is therefore crucial to simultaneously examine the individual effects of i-
deals alongside the unit effects. We need to conduct multilevel studies to see whether units 
showing high variation in i-deals also have higher unit (indicating positive effects of i-deals) 
or lower unit (consistent with i-deals associating with felt violation of employees not 
receiving i-deals) performance and other outcomes. 
Our second concern is that i-deal measures confound several components of which we 
consider two here: the negotiation accompanying the i-deal and the actual reward received 
resulting from the negotiation. It is therefore unclear which of these two components are 
causing the effects associated with i-deals measures: Are the effects of i-deals found in 
studies the result of negotiating the i-deal, or a result of what the employee actually gets? For 
example, if an employee negotiates pay in excess of their peers, the fact that the employee 
has successfully negotiated an i-deal may lead to feelings of satisfaction, and the increase in 
pay resulting from the i-deal may also lead to feelings of satisfaction.  Therefore, research 
needs to isolate the effects of the negotiation of the deal per se from what is received. 
Research designs need to measure the negotiation component and the rewards components 
when examining i-deals in order to capture the unique effects of each on outcomes. 
I-deals research designs need to consider reverse causality issues. Research assumes 
that i-deals lead to positive outcomes such as employee motivation, commitment and 
performance; however, these attitudes and behaviours are also the reasons why employees are 
offered i-deals and are therefore just as likely to be the causes of i-deals. We need to consider 
these possibilities and the longer-term trajectories of employee attitudes and behaviour. If the 
award of an i-deal does little to significantly alter the trajectory of employee attitudes and 
behaviour over time, then the i-deal is having no effect; however, in such cases cross-
sectional or limited time-point longitudinal data will likely record spurious associations 
between i-deals and ‘outcomes’.  
Last but not least, i-deals research is characterized by cross-sectional, self-report, 
single source designs. The limitations of such designs are well-documented (e.g., see Conway 
& Briner [2005] for how such designs are limited for examining social exchange ideas), and 
are a general concern in management research, so we will not go into any depth here. In brief, 
such designs are inappropriate for validly measuring many types of phenomena (such as 











We have presented a wide range of critical observations. In essence, i-deals are unclearly 
defined and so we do not know what i-deals are.  There are major inconsistencies across i-
deal measures and none of the measures capture all its features, and we are unsure as to 
whether and how i-deals affect parties to the negotiation and third parties. Indeed, there are 
good reasons for suspecting i-deals to be detrimental to coworkers and organizations, and 
existing findings used to support the positive effects of i-deals may in fact indicate that i-
deals drive down the attitudes of non-recipients via unfavourable social comparisons. 
In a similar manner to the way researchers criticized advocates of models of the 
flexible firm and flexible employment contracts for moving confusingly between description, 
prediction and prescription (see Pollert, 1988), statements about i-deals flit between 
describing them as a growing trend in organizations, as a way to explain how to motivate 
contributions in recipients, and as a prescription to organizations about how to retain valued 
workers. In any case, at present we think i-deals fall short on all fronts. I-deals are too loosely 
defined to precisely describe activity, there is no clear theory to link i-deals with employee 
contributions, and the commonly used social exchange theory suggests – at best – mixed 
effects on outcomes. Given the failure to describe and predict, we’re not in a position to 
prescribe i-deals to organizations. 
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Table 1. An overview of I-Deals Definitions, Methods, and Findings 
Study Definition Dimensions Example item Outcomes Moderators Design Findings Sample 
Hornung, S., 
Rousseau, D. 
M., & Glaser, J. 
(2008) 
Idiosyncratic deals (“i-deals”), where 
individual employees negotiate with an 
employer to adapt work arrangements to 
better meet their personal needs 
(Rousseau, 2005). ...I-deals are a form 
of customization granting employees 
special conditions differing from peers 
doing similar work. Not limited to 
freelancers (Pink, 2002) or stars (Rosen, 
1981), regular employees also seek out 
and bargain for special employment 
conditions that satisfy their personal 




Hornung et al (2008) 
measure: Respondents 
rated the extent to which 
they had ‘asked for and 
successfully negotiated 
individual arrangements 
different from their peers 
in terms of flexibility and 
development … ‘flexibility 
in starting and ending the 









None Cross-sectional Work arrangements and personal initiative 
predicted i-deal negotiation; 
Developmental i-deals positively related to 
affective commitment, work-family 
conflict, performance expectations, and 
overtime; Flexibility i-deals negatively 







M., & Glaser, J. 
(2009) 
I-deals are special terms of employment, 
negotiated by individual workers and 
authorized by agents of their employers 
(e.g. supervisors, higher-level managers, 
human resource representatives; 






Adapted from Rousseau 
and Kim (2006): to what 
extent have you (the 
supervisor) authorized 










None Cross-sectional Employee initiative associated with 
authorization of developmental and 
flexibility i-deals; unfulfilled obligations 
positively associated with workload 
reduction i-deals. Developmental ideals 
associated with increased performance, 
changes in employee motivation; 
flexibility i-deals associated with changes 
in work-life balance.  
 






M., & Chang, 
K. T. T. (2009) 
Idiosyncratic deals (i-deals for short) are 
personalized employment arrangements 
negotiated between individual workers 
and employers and intended to benefit 
them both (Rousseau, 2001). 
General item “the kinds of requests that 
individual workers make to 
their employer to obtain 
atypical or nonstandard 
employment arrangements. 
These requests cover a host 
of issues from working 
conditions (e.g., schedule, 
working at home), 
development opportunities 
(e.g., special training, 
assignments) as well as 
other benefits.” … “If your 
coworkers ask for special 
individual arrangements in 
the near future, to what 
extent would you be 
willing to accept them 
having arrangements 
different  






More likely to accept another's i-deal 
when the other is a close friend, when you 
believe a similar deal may be offered to 
you in the future, when you have a social 
exchange relationship with your employer, 
and less likely to be accepting when you 
have economic exchange. 












Hornung, S., & 
Kim, T.G 
(2009) 
I-deals are personalized agreements of a 
non-standard nature individual 
employees seek out and negotiate with 
their employer 
2 Dimensions: 
Work hours and 
Developmental 
Extent to which participant 
had asked for and 
successfully negotiated a 








None Cross sectional  
T1 and T2 data 
Ex post negotiation positive related to SE 
and negatively related to EE; 
developmental I-deals positively related to 
SE; work hour I-deals negatively related to 
SE; Developmental I-Deals negatively 
related and work hour I-deals positively 
related to EE 
 




Vidyarthi, P. R., 
Liden, R. C., & 
Rousseau, D. 
M. (2010) 
Idiosyncratic deals (i-deals) are 
individually bargained employment 
arrangements intended to benefit both 
worker and organization. I-deals are not 
individuals’ subjective understandings, 
as are “psychological contracts” (worker 
beliefs regarding exchange relationships 
in employment). Rather, they are 
objective conditions that employees 
negotiate with an employer to enhance 




"Supervisors were asked if 




activities,” and “career 
development 
opportunities” that were 
“different from his/her 
coworkers”" 
OCBI, OCBO LMX, POS Cross-sectional I-deals positively related to OCBO and 
OCBI; Relationship between i-deals and 
OCBO and OCBI stronger when LMX 
low; relationship between i-deals and 
OCBO stronger when TMX low; No 
moderating effect of POS. I-deals have no 
effect in high quality relationships, but are 












M., Glaser, J., 
Angerer, P., & 
Weigl, M. 
(2010) 
Idiosyncratic deals, in general, are 
employment terms individuals negotiate 
for themselves, taking myriad forms 
from flexible schedules to career 
development (Rousseau, 2001, 2005). 
1 dimension: 
Task related  
Based on Hornung et al. 
(2008) and Rousseau & 
Kim (2006): Respondents 
rated the extent to which 
they had ‘asked for and 
successfully negotiated 
personalized conditions in 
their current job, e.g., 
special job duties or 
assignments, work tasks 











None Cross-sectional LMX associated with task I-deals; task i-
deals positively associated with 
complexity and control and negatively 
with stressors that in turn associated 







Ng, T.W.H., & 
Feldman, D.C 
(2010) 
Idiosyncratic contracts are employment 
arrangements that are different in nature 
from those given to other employees and 
are crafted to meet the specific needs of 
individual employees. These 
idiosyncratic contracts offer employees 
additional resources (e.g., special 
promotion tracks or flexible scheduling) 
not readily available to their colleagues 
(Rousseau, Ho, & Greenberg, 2006) 













This organization provides 
me with a level of pay that 
most employees in my 






Cross lagged: IV at 
T1 and DV at T2 
I-contracts positively linked to AC; 
relationship stronger for low CSE (no 
support for age as moderator) and 
strongest relationship between i-contracts 
and AC for individuals low in CSE and 















P., & Weigl, 
M. (2011)  
Idiosyncratic deals (called "i-deals" by 
some authors) are personalized 
arrangements workers negotiate with 
their employer to make their jobs more 
supportive of their individual needs, 
preferences, and aspirations (Rousseau, 
2001, 2005; Rousseau, Ho, & 
Greenberg, 2006). … idiosyncratic deals 
have been suggested to be mutually 
beneficial for employees and employers 
by increasing the fit between the person 
and the job and thereby providing 
conditions which support the worker's 




Hornung et al. (2008) 
measure: Respondents rated 
the extent to which they had 
‘negotiated personalized 
working conditions deviating 
from applicable standards on 
a 5-point scale" in terms of 
flexibility and 
development … ‘more 





None Cross-lagged Leader consideration positively related to i-deals; 
developmental i-deals predicted work 
engagement; flexibility i-deals negatively 
predicted work family conflict; mediating effect 
of i-deals in relationship between leader 
consideration and work engagement/work-family 
conflict 
159 at T1 and 
142 at T2 
hospital 
physicians 
used in prior 
study  
Lee, C., & 
Hui, C 
(2011) 
Idiosyncratic deals refer to the special 
conditions that individual workers 
bargain for, and that differ from the 












None Cross lagged (6 
weeks): I-deals at 
T1 and DV at time 
2  
Individualism positively related to ex ante but 
not ex post i-deals; social skills positively related 
to ex ante and ex post i-deals; perceived insider 
status positively related to ex post i-deals; ex ante 
i-deals more positively related to transactional 
psychological contracts than ex post i-deals; ex 
post i-deals more positively related to relational 
and balanced psychological contracts than ex 
ante; personal development i-deals more 
positively related to relational and balanced 
psychological contracts; flexibility and workload 
reduction i-deals relate more positively to 






Bal, P. M., 
De Jong, S. 
B., Jansen, P. 
G., & 
Bakker, A. B. 
(2012) 
I-deals are defined as ‘voluntary, 
personalized agreements of a 
nonstandard nature negotiated between 
individual employees and their 
employers regarding terms that benefit 





Hornung et al (2008) 
measure: Respondents rated 
the extent to which they had 
‘asked for and successfully 
negotiated individual 
arrangements different from 
their peers’ in terms of 
flexibility and development 
‘flexibility in starting and 
ending the working day’ and 










Cross-sectional Flexibility i-deals but not developmental i-deals 
positively associated with motivation to continue 
working. Accommodative climate moderated the 
relationship between developmental i-deals and 
motivation to continue working and development 
climate moderated the relationship between 











Future i-deals (Rousseau et al., 2006) 
and contract idiosyncrasy. Difference is 
"research on i-deals has examined how 
employees react to i-deals after they 
have been honored (or not). Contract 
idiosyncrasy has focused on how 
employees react to promises of future i-
deals before they have been honored"  









This organization promises 
me a level of pay that most 
employees in my team/unit 







Cross lagged: IV 
at T1 and DV at 
T2 
Breach of past promises negatively related to 
AC; no moderating effect of future i-deals on 
relationship between breach and AC; Negative 
relationship between breach and AC is strongest 
when future-ideals promised and few job 
alternatives. Item level analysis - effect size of 
three-way interaction strongest for support for 
personal problems, job security, pay and skill 













I-deals - special employment 
arrangements that are tailored to the 






Hornung et al. (2008) “I 
asked for and successfully 
negotiated individual 
arrangements different from 
my peers in terms of 
flexibility in starting and 














measured on three 
measurement 
occasions over 10 
months 
Flexibility i-deals associated with voice behavior 
in China but not US sample. Professional 
development i-deals associated with voice 
behaviour. Support for mediating role of flexible 
work orientation in the professional development 
i-deals and voice relationship in Chinese sample.  
Networking behaviour mediates i-deals - voice 
relationship in both samples. Organizational trust 
mediates relationship between scheduling 
flexibility i-deals and voice in both samples but 
found to mediate the relationship between 
professional development i-deals and voice in 
Chinese sample only. Stronger mediating role of 
flexible work role orientation, social networking 
behaviour and organizational trust found in 
China than US. 
 
265 US and 
201 Chinese 
Managers 
Liu, J., Lee, 
C., Hui, C., 
Kwan, H. K., 
& Wu, L. Z. 
(2013) 
Employees increasingly negotiate 
idiosyncratic deals (“ideals”), that is, 
customized work arrangements, with 









Individualism Cross Lagged: IVs 
at Time 1, 
mediators Time 2 
and DVs at Time 
3 
POS mediates relationship between i-deals and 
AC and proactive behaviours; OBSE mediates 
the relationship between i-deals and AC and 
proactive behaviours; OBSE’s mediation 
significant for high individualism and mediation 













I-deals: "voluntary, personalized 
agreements of a nonstandard nature 
negotiated between individual 
employers and employees regarding 










Because of my personal 
circumstances, my supervisor 
has created a compensation 
arrangement that is tailored 
to fit me. 16-item scale 






None Longitudinal (10 
weeks): I-deals at 
T1 and T2, DVs at 
time 2 
Study 3: Task and work responsibility i-deals 
positively related to JS and all types of OC; 
Financial incentives i-deals linked to continuance 
OC and schedule flexibility i-deals linked to job 
satisfaction 




     None Longitudinal (5 
weeks): I-deals at 
T1 and T2, DVs at 
time 2  
Study 4: Task and work responsibility i-deals 
positively related to JS and all types of OC 
except continuance OC; Schedule flexibility i-
deals linked to JS, affective OC and continuance 
OC; Financial incentives i-deals and location 
flexibility i-deals not related to job satisfaction 
and OC 





A., Anand, S 
& Liden, B.C 
(2014) 
I-deals defined as personalized 
employment arrangements negotiated 
between individual workers and 





Managers were asked "This 
employee is given flexibility 
in starting and ending his/her 




None Cross sectional U-shaped relationship between flexibility i-deals 
and POS and career satisfaction - high POS and 
career satisfaction found at low and high levels 
of flexibility ideals 
207 
supervisor- 
subordinate 
dyads of 
computer 
engineers in 
India 
 
 
